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Abstract 
 
There is ample evidence that human primates strive for social contact and experience interactions 
with conspecifics as intrinsically rewarding. Focusing on gaze behavior as a crucial means of 
human interaction, this study employed a unique combination of neuroimaging, eye-tracking, 
and computer-animated virtual agents to assess the neural mechanisms underlying this 
component of behavior. In the interaction task, participants believed that during each interaction 
the agent’s gaze behavior could either be controlled by another participant or by a computer 
program. Their task was to indicate whether they experienced a given interaction as an 
interaction with another human participant or the computer program based on the agent’s 
reaction. Unbeknownst to them, the agent was always controlled by a computer to enable a 
systematic manipulation of gaze reactions by varying the degree to which the agent engaged in 
joint attention. This allowed creating a tool to distinguish neural activity underlying the 
subjective experience of being in engaged in social and non-social interaction. In contrast to 
previous research, this allows measuring neural activity while participants experience active 
engagement in real-time social interactions. Results demonstrate that gaze-based interactions 
with a perceived human partner are associated with activity in the ventral striatum, a core 
component of reward-related neurocircuitry. In contrast, interactions with a computer-driven 
agent activate attention networks. Comparisons of neural activity during interaction with 
behaviorally naïve and explicitly cooperative partners demonstrate different temporal dynamics 
of the reward system and indicate that the mere experience of engagement in social interaction is 
sufficient to recruit this system. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In the hierarchy of human needs, the need to affiliate with others has been located directly after 
physiological and prior to egoistic needs related to self-actualization and esteem (Maslow, 1943). 
Accordingly, an intrinsic motivation for social interaction unique to the human species has been 
proposed (Baumeister and Leary, 1995; Tomasello, 2009).  Over the last decade,  multiple 
neuroeconomic studies have indeed found reward-related brain activity during social interactions 
(Rilling and Sanfey, 2011). Two key regions of the reward system are the ventral striatum (VS) 
and the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC) which have been implicated in the anticipation and 
consumption of rewards (Berridge et al., 2009). While the VS has been specifically linked to the 
anticipation of rewards and the computation of reward prediction errors (Báez-Mendoza and 
Schultz, 2013; Daniel and Pollmann, 2014), the mOFC appears to be involved in the subjective 
experience of reward (Peters and Büchel, 2010) as well as value-guided decision making 
(Noonan et al., 2012). While many studies indicate a link between social interaction and the 
reward system (Krach et al., 2010; Rilling and Sanfey, 2011), , the application of economic 
games to study social interaction typically involves high-level concepts such as trust, fairness, 
cooperation, or competition (Fehr and Camerer, 2007). As a consequence, the claim that 
experiencing engagement in interaction with others per se is rewarding has never been put to the 
test.  
An understanding of the neural mechanisms underlying human sociality has recently 
been argued to require measurements of brain activity during active participation in naturalistic 
social interactions rather than detached observation of social stimuli (Hari and Kujala, 2009; 
Schilbach et al., 2013). Accordingly, there is growing consensus that “it is in engagement with 
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other people rather than in thought that people normally and fundamentally know other people” 
(Reddy and Morris, 2004, p. 657). The relative paucity of studies of naturalistic social 
interactions can be explained by the difficulty of designing experimental paradigms which allow 
experimental control while participants subjectively experience engagement in social interaction. 
Up to date, the most natural social interactions have been studied using EEG hyperscanning 
while participants perform spontaneous motor coordination tasks (e.g. Tognoli et al., 2007; 
Dumas et al., 2010), engage in joint attention (Lachat et al., 2012) or play games together 
(Babiloni et al., 2007; Astolfi et al., 2010). However, the types of interactions are too complex 
for application in fMRI studies – either due to the involvement of excessive movements or due to 
the inherent complexity in the case of spontaneous motor coordination tasks (Pfeiffer et al., 
2013; Schilbach et al., 2013).  
The aim of the present study was to investigate the function of the reward-system during 
naturalistic interactions. To this end, we addressed the neural mechanisms supporting the 
subjective experience of being engaged in social interaction by examining neural activity while 
participants actively participated in gaze-based interactions. Gaze was selected because it 
constitutes a crucial domain of everyday social encounters and has the advantage that it can be 
implemented inside an MRI scanner due to the minimal involvement of body movements 
(Pfeiffer et al., 2013). Gaze behavior was visualized via computer-animated agents in real-time 
(e.g. Fox et al., 2009). The combination of neuroimaging, eye-tracking and virtual reality 
techniques allowed implementing realistic but basic social interactions while maintaining 
experimental control (Bohil et al., 2011; Pfeiffer et al., 2013).    
The interaction task applied in the present study was designed to create situations in 
which the gaze-based interaction with a virtual agent either induced the subjective experience of 
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being engaged in human social interaction or the subjective experience of being in a non-social 
interaction – i.e. with a computer program. To this end, each block of the interaction task 
comprised five trials in which the agent would either engage in joint or non-joint attention with 
the participant (Figure 1A/B). Joint attention was chosen as a building block of the interaction 
task because it is a core component of naturalistic social interactions (Mundy and Newell, 2007). 
Participants believed that during each block the agent was either controlled by a computer 
algorithm or a human interaction partner. In fact, the interaction partner was a confederate and 
the agent’s gaze behavior was always controlled by the algorithm to permit systematic 
manipulation. This was accomplished by varying the proportion of joint attention trials from zero 
to five out of five, thereby modifying behavioral contingency over a block. Participants’ task was 
to decide on the nature of their interaction partner based on the agent’s reactions during each 
block. Thereby, the decision between human and computer emerged during the course of the 
interaction, while other studies explicated this distinction a priori as an independent variable 
(McCabe et al., 2001; Gallagher et al., 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003). This allowed assessing the 
neural mechanisms underlying the subjective experience of being engaged in human social 
interaction (Pfeiffer et al., 2011).  
Unconstrained as well as cooperative interaction contexts were established in two phases 
in which the interaction partner was either introduced as naïve to participants’ task, or as an 
explicit cooperator (e.g. Taborsky, 2007) helping them to identify human interactions. Based on 
the claim that social interaction is per se rewarding, we hypothesized that the reward component 
inherent to cooperative contexts would already be present in unconstrained interactions. 
Furthermore, we predicted that the striatum would encode reward components related to a 
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motivation to interact, whereas the orbitofrontal cortex was expected to encode the rewarding 
experience.  
 
 
2. Materials and Methods 
 
2.1 Participants 
32 right-handed volunteers participated in the study, which was approved by the ethics 
committee of the Medical Faculty of the University of Cologne. 12 participants were excluded 
due to excessive movements (n = 4), technical problems with the eye-tracker (n = 5), and 
disbelief in the cover story (n = 3). 20 participants (9 female/11 male, M = 27.75 years, SD ± 
6.44) were included in the analyses. 
 
2.2 Visual stimulation and eye-tracking  
The paradigm is an fMRI adaptation of the ‘non-verbal Turing test’ which has recently been 
validated behaviorally (Pfeiffer et al., 2011) and used the same male virtual agent displaying a 
neutral facial expression as has been used in previous studies to ensure comparability (Pfeiffer et 
al., 2011, 2012; Schilbach et al., 2010). Stimuli were presented using a thin-film-transistor liquid 
crystal display (TFT-LCD) screen attached at a distance of 100 cm from the end of the scanner 
(viewing angle: 14° x 18° horizontal x vertical). They were displayed to participants via a mirror 
on the head coil. Participants’ gaze was monitored via the same mirror using an EyeLink 1000 
eye-tracking system (SR Research, Missisauga, Canada). Gaze data were collected at a sampling 
rate of 500 Hz on the EyeLink host computer and made available to PresentationTM 
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(Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA) for interactive stimulus presentation (Wilms et al., 
2010).  
 
2.3 Interaction task 
Participants interacted with a virtual agent in a series of interaction blocks (Figure 1A). They 
believed that in each block the gaze reactions of the agent were either controlled by another 
participant or a computer algorithm. In fact, the other participant was a confederate and the 
agent’s reactions were always computer-controlled to allow for systematic variation. Each block 
(Figure 1A) comprised five trials (Figure 1B) in which the agent engaged in joint (JA) or non-
joint attention (NJA). Systematic variation resulted in six experimental conditions (0/5, 1/5, 2/5, 
3/5, 4/5, and 5/5 times of JA) and a control condition in which the agent closed its eyes on each 
trial. Each of these seven conditions was repeated six times in each interaction context, thus 
yielding 42 blocks per context. In the control condition, participants disengaged from the actual 
task and only were required to watch the face and press one of the two buttons after the end of 
the block. The rationale was to improve the model in the fMRI analyses by including a regressor 
relating for task-unspecific perceptual and motor aspects. Similar control conditions were used in 
previous studies of live interactions (e.g. Redcay et al., 2010, 2012; Schilbach et al., 2010). The 
trial-by-trial variation of gaze behavior thereby induced a variation of behavioral contingency, 
which increased the more often the agent displayed the same reaction during one block. An agent 
engaging in JA in each trial (positive contingency) therefore behaved as contingently as an agent 
engaging in NJA in each trial (negative contingency).  
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Figure 1: Task structure and behavioral results  
(A)  Each interaction block comprises five gaze trials. At the end of each block participants indicate whether they 
experienced this interaction as social (‘human’) or non-social (‘computer’). This block exemplifies a 3/5 condition 
in which the agent engages in joint attention three out of five possible times. (B) In each of five trials of an 
interaction block, participants initiate an exchange of gaze shifts. (C) In the naïve context, the mean proportion of 
‘human’ ratings correlates with increased congruency of gaze reactions. (D) In the cooperative context, the mean 
proportion of ‘human’ ratings correlates with the mere contingency of the agent’s gaze reactions. Error bars indicate 
95% confidence intervals. 
 
At the beginning of a trial, participants established eye contact with the agent within 1000 
ms. Upon eye contact, two objects appeared, one of which participants had to fixate within 1500 
ms. If participants fixated an object earlier than 1500 ms, the remaining time was added to the 
jittered break at the end of the trial in order to keep average trial length at 4000 ms. If there was 
no fixation within these time limits, trials were aborted and the block registered as invalid. 
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Selected objects were marked in blue to provide participants with feedback about successful gaze 
registration. They were informed that their initial gaze shift to the object was transmitted to an 
agent on the other participant’s screen in real-time, and that they would likewise see the other’s 
gaze reaction as visualized on their screen. With a jittered latency of 400 – 600 ms (Pfeiffer et 
al., 2012), the agent followed participants’ gaze or looked to the other object, thereby 
establishing JA or NJA. This reaction was displayed until trial duration of 3500 ms was reached. 
Before the next trial started, a blank screen was presented for 500 - 1000 ms plus the remaining 
time of the object fixation phase. 
After each block, participants indicated whether they believed they had been interacting 
with the other participant or a computer algorithm by button press within a response window of 
1500 ms. The response window was followed by a jittered break of 5000 to 7000 ms before the 
next block began. 
 
2.4 Interaction contexts 
The experiment consisted of two phases to distinguish unconstrained from cooperative 
interactions. In the first phase, the confederate was introduced as naïve to participants’ task. 
Participants were told that their interaction partner had been instructed to react to each of their 
gaze shifts by looking at one of the objects without any additional information. This was 
supposed to provide an unconstrained interaction context in which participants had no a priori 
assumptions about the other’s behavior. In the second phase, the other was introduced as 
cooperative in order to assess neural activity while participants engage in the same type of 
interaction in a cooperative context. They were told that the other’s task was now to react to 
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them in such a way that would facilitate the distinction between human- and computer-controlled 
interactions. It was not specified in which exact way the interaction partner would do this. 
The order of the two phases was not randomized because the naïve condition required 
participants to assume that the other did not have any knowledge about their task and reacted in 
an unconstrained fashion. Specifically, we wanted to prevent activation of the high-level 
concept of cooperation before participants engage in naïve interactions because this could have 
primed expectations leveling out effects of mere interactivity in the second phase. To prevent 
habituation and novelty effects, participants engaged in a practice session of 5 minutes before the 
first run. During this session, the experimenter monitored their behavior to provide additional 
instruction if necessary. As noted above, the design is a within-subject adaptation of a behavioral 
study (Pfeiffer et al., 2011). Behavioral results replicate those of the between-subject version (see 
Figure 2 of Pfeiffer et al., 2011). Moreover, participants’ responses in the debriefing 
questionnaires did not indicate differences between the within- and between-subject version 
(compare Figure 2 of the present study and Figure S1 of Pfeiffer et al., 2011).  
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Figure 2: Participants’ responses to post-experiment questionnaires 
(A) Results indicate that the decision was more difficult in the naïve than in the cooperative context. (B) In the naïve 
context, the decision was not based on strategic thinking and explicit decision criteria, but on intuitive processes. (C) 
Participants preferred grounding their decision on considerations about human behavior rather than about the 
functionality of a computer program. (D) Interactions experienced as social interactions with another human 
participant were experienced as more enjoyable than non-social interactions. 
 
2.5 Procedure 
Participants received detailed written instructions covering the interaction task. Before they were 
led to the scanner, they were briefly introduced to the confederate, who was seemingly being 
instructed at the same time. Upon calibration of the eye-tracker, scanning commenced with a 
12 
 
practice session of eight blocks. The ensuing experiment had two phases, each consisting of two 
10-minute runs that were preceded by a re-calibration of the eye-tracker. The experiment started 
with the naïve phase. After the second run, there was a break of 3 minutes. During this break, 
participants were instructed that their interaction partner received additional instructions and that 
a cooperative phase was now beginning. After the first and third run there was a short break. In 
each run, all conditions were repeated thrice in a randomized fashion. After the experiment, 
participants completed a questionnaire (Figure 2). Among other questions, this questionnaire 
contained the question, how pleasant participants experienced interactions with humans and 
computers, respectively. Following this question, they had the chance to note down any 
comments they had with respect to the study. People who uttered disbelief in the cover story 
were later excluded from the analysis. Upon completion of data acquisition, participants received 
an email debriefing them in detail regarding the cover story and the experiment. They were then 
asked explicitly whether they had believed to be interacting with another human participant in 
some of the interaction blocks. This served as the final manipulation check and determined 
whether participants entered data analysis or not. 
 
2.6 Behavioral data analysis 
Prior to analysis, an arcsine transformation was performed to correct for violations of normality 
(McDonald, 2009). The effects of the factors Context (naïve vs. cooperative) and Gaze 
contingency (JA trials/block) on participants’ ratings were analyzed using repeated-measures 
ANOVAs. Planned polynomial contrasts were applied for trend analyses. All results were 
Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. Effect size was calculated as ω² (Cohen, 1988): small effects: ω² 
< .006; moderate effects: ω2 < 0.15; large effects: ω2 >0.15.  
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To examine how participants' decision-making process unfolded over time, we assessed 
how the blocks' rating was influenced by the occurrence of JA or NJA on each of its five trials. 
The rationale behind these analyses is that we sought to obtain an implicit measure of how trial 
information was integrated in the two different interaction contexts. This was necessary because 
post-experiment questionnaires can only provide explicit, introspective and therefore 
subjectively biased information about decision-making. Initially, we performed three logistic 
regressions with Rating (computer = 0, human = 1) as dependent variable using the ‘Forward’ 
method, in which predictors are added consecutively – starting with the strongest, and adding 
predictors with decreasing strength until adding a new predictor fails to explain more variance. 
The first analysis was performed over both contexts (naïve and cooperative) and included ten 
predictors: five Trial predictors for the agent’s reactions on each of the five trials (NJA = 0, JA = 
1), and five Trial x Context (naive = 0, cooperative = 1) predictors. Subsequently, we performed 
two separate logistic regressions for each context (naive vs. cooperative), in which only the 
agent’s reactions on the five trials were entered as predictors. 
 
2.7 Functional data acquisition 
 Scanning was performed on a Siemens Trio 3-T scanner (Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen, 
Germany). A T2*-weighted gradient echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence with the following 
parameters was used: TR = 2200 ms, TE = 30 ms, 36 axial slices, slice thickness = 3.0 mm, in-
plane resolution = 3.0 x 3.0 mm, field of view = 200.0 x 200.0 mm. In each run, 280 images 
were acquired. The first five images of each run were discarded to eliminate saturation effects. 
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2.8 Functional data preprocessing 
Images were processed using SPM8 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience, London, 
UK). Motion correction was completed by an affine registration procedure (Ashburner and 
Friston, 1999). Images were then realigned to the first image of the time series and subsequently 
to the mean of these images. Next, the mean EPI was computed for each participant and spatially 
normalized to the MNI single subject template (Collins et al., 1994) using the unified 
segmentation function of SPM8 with a 2x2x2 mm isotropic resolution. The ensuing deformation 
was applied to individual EPI volumes. Spatial smoothing of the normalized images was 
performed using an 8-mm FWHM Gaussian kernel. 
 
2.9 Functional data analysis 
Data were analyzed using a General Linear Model as implemented in SPM8. The following 
general specifications apply to all conducted analyses, each of which will be described in detail 
thereafter. Low-frequency signal drifts were removed using a high-pass filter with a cutoff of 
128 seconds (Macey et al., 2004). At subject level, experimental conditions were modeled by a 
boxcar reference vector convolved with the canonical hemodynamic response function. Invalid 
blocks were modeled on a distinct regressor. Each experimental condition was contrasted against 
the implicit baseline by weighting the regressor of interest with 1 and the remaining regressors 
with 0, and the resulting contrasts were fed into a flexible factorial design (as provided by 
SPM8) with factors Subject and Condition using a random-effects model for group level 
comparisons (Worsley et al., 1996). Here, all effects were thresholded at p < .05 at cluster-level, 
family-wise-error-corrected for multiple comparisons (pFWE-corr < .05), with an underlying voxel-
level threshold of p < .001, uncorrected. Version 1.8 of the SPM anatomy toolbox (Eickhoff et 
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al., 2005) and the brain atlas of Duvernoy (Duvernoy, 1999) were used for anatomical 
localization. Activation maps were superimposed on an SPM canonical T1-weighted image. 
Error bars of the parameter estimates indicate 90% confidence intervals.  
The present study design allows multiple different analyses, which made it necessary to 
select a strategy for data analysis which allows addressing the main questions of our study. The 
first major question concerned the neural mechanisms of the experience of being actively 
engaged in social interaction (i.e. ‘human’- versus ‘computer’-rated blocks) and a possible 
modulation of these mechanisms by interaction context. The second key question addressed the 
temporal integration of behavioral cues (i.e. gaze reactions) depending on interaction context. 
Study design therefore justified three major lines of analysis: 
(1) Analysis based on participants’ ratings (analyses 1 – 3). The first three analyses were 
guided by participants’ responses to examine activity differences between interactions rated as 
‘human’ (hum) and ‘computer’ (com). At the subject level of the first analysis, blocks rated as 
‘human’ and ‘computer’ were modeled on distinct regressors, separately for the two contexts. 
Stimulus events were defined from block onset to block end (defined by the response window, 
total duration of 20000 ms). At group level, we tested for effects of the rating both collapsed 
across the two contexts (humall block>comall block and comall block> humall block), as well separately for 
the naïve and the cooperative context (humnaïve block>comnaïve block, comnaïve block> humcoop block, 
humcoop block>comcoop block, comcoop block> humcoop block). Two further analyses were informed by the 
output of the regressions performed on the behavioral data. In the second analysis, early 
components of decision-making in blocks rated as ‘human’ and as ‘computer’ were analyzed by 
confining stimulus events to the first two trials (8000 ms) of a block. Group level contrasts were: 
humnaïve_early>comnaïve_early, comnaïve_early>humnaïve_early, humcoop_early>comcoop_early, and 
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comcoop_first>humcoop_first. In the third analysis, the effect of trial progression was modeled by 
using linear parametric modulation of the BOLD response by trial position, separately for blocks 
rated as ‘human’ and ‘computer’ and for naïve and cooperative contexts. By doing so, we 
isolated brain regions in which activity increased with increasing trial position. This resulted in 
the following group level comparisons: humnaïve_param>comnaïve_param, comnaïve_param>humnaïve_param, 
humcoop_param> comcoop_param, and comcoop_param>humcoop_param.  
(2) Analysis based on gaze contingency (analysis 4). Driven by the manipulation of gaze 
contingency across proceeding trials within each block, the fourth analysis tested for linear 
increases of neural activity with increasing positive and negative contingency. At subject level, 
blocks with different conditions of contingency (0/5, 1/5, 2/5, 3/5, 4/5, and 5/5 times of JA) were 
modeled as distinct regressors, separately for the naïve and the cooperative context. At group 
level, we applied differentially weighted contrasts in order to test for effects of increasing 
positive contingency (naïveincrease_JA and coopincrease_JA: -3 -2 -1 1 2 3), and for effects of 
increasing negative contingency (naïveincrease_NJA and coopincrease_NJA: 3 2 1 -1 -2 -3). 
 (3) Event-related analysis of joint attention (analysis 5). In the final analysis we 
compared how JA and NJA trials were processed in the naïve and cooperative contexts 
irrespective of the experimental condition in which they occurred. Notably, JA and NJA 
constitute complex events comprising multiple steps such as the establishment of mutual gaze, a 
gaze shift to one of the objects and a gaze reaction by the agent. Nonetheless, they can be used in 
such a fashion because they only differ in one crucial aspect – i.e. the congruency of the agent’s 
gaze reaction which either follows participants’ gaze or averts its gaze to the other object, 
thereby engaging in JA or NJA, respectively (e.g. Materna et al., 2008; Schilbach et al., 2010; 
Redcay et al., 2012). For this analysis, stimulus events were defined at subject level from trial 
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onset to the trial end defined by the appearance of the blank screen, thereby amounting to a 
length of 3500 ms. JA and NJA trials were modeled on distinct regressors, separately for the 
naïve and the cooperative contexts. At group level, the following contrasts were computed: 
JAnaïve>NJAnaïve, NJAnaïve>JAnaïve, JAcoop>NJAcoop, NJAcoop>JAcoop. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
3.1 Behavioral 
 
3.1.1 Effect of gaze contingency and context on participants’ decisions  
Blocks containing invalid trials (naïve context: 6.67 %, cooperative context: 6.11 %) were 
excluded from the analysis. In the remaining blocks, results demonstrated a main effect of gaze 
contingency on participants’ ratings, F(2.45, 46.55) = 13.19, p < .001, ω² = .23, and a significant 
interaction between instruction and contingency, F(3.13, 59.35) = 11.19, p < .001, ω² = .08. This 
interaction was scrutinized by separate analyses of ratings in the naïve and the cooperative 
context. In the naïve context (Figure 1C), there was a significant main effect of gaze contingency 
on participants’ ratings, F(2.76, 52.38) = 3.55, p = .023, ω² = .03. Planned polynomial contrasts 
revealed that this effect was characterized by a significant linear trend, F(1, 19) = 7.84, p = .011, 
ω² = .29, thereby indicating that the proportion of blocks the proportion of ‘human’-rated blocks 
were positively correlated with the number of joint attention trials per block. This means that 
‘human’ ratings increased with increasing numbers of joint attention trials and thus argues for a particular 
importance of congruent reactions during unconstrained interactions. In the cooperative context 
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(Figure 1D), contingency also had a significant effect on participants’ ratings, F(2.79, 52.95) = 
21.79, p < .001, ω² = .27. This was characterized by a significant linear trend, F(1, 19) = 20.21, p 
< .001, ω² = .19, and a quadratic trend, F(1, 19) = 36.63, p < .001, ω² = .39, which indicates that 
‘human’ ratings were more closely related to the general contingency of reactions. This suggests 
that any consistent behavior over an entire block was taken as indicative of a human counterpart 
and replicates the findings of a behavioral between-subject version of the present task (Pfeiffer et 
al., 2011).  
 
3.1.2 Temporal integration of information 
The results of the logistic regression over both interaction contexts are listed in the top half of 
Table 1. The final three trials showed up as main effects across both contexts, with the fourth 
trial weighing in the heaviest: if on this trial the agent engaged in joint attention, the chances of 
rating ‘human’ are over 1.59 times higher than when the agent looks the other way. Most 
importantly, however, the second trial loaded only in interaction with condition. The second and 
third logistic regression, for the naïve and cooperative contexts respectively, confirmed the 
persistence of the main effects for the final three trials in both contexts (Table 1, bottom half). In 
the naïve context, already the second trial had a significant influence on the final rating, with 
‘human’ becoming 1.38 times more likely than ‘computer’ if the agent engaged in joint attention 
on that trial. Such an early component was absent in the cooperative context where the second 
trial did not load at all. In sum, there is an early influence of trial type in the naïve context, which 
is absent in the cooperative context, where the integration of information related to decision-
making is approximately linear. 
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Table 1. Regression coefficients for the logistic regression models. 
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	  	   Coeff	   SE	   Wald	   Odds	  ratio	   95	  %	  CI	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  NAIVE	  +	  COOP:	  Main	  effect	  of	  trials	  and	  
interaction	  of	  trials*condition	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  2nd	  trial	  (NJA	  vs	  JA)	  *	  Condition	  (NAIVE	  vs	  COOP)	   0.284	   0.087	   10.70**	   1.33	   [1.12	  -­‐	  1.58]	  
3rd	  trial	  NJA	  vs	  JA	   0.293	   0.079	   13.63***	   1.34	   [1.15	  -­‐	  1.57]	  
4th	  trial	  NJA	  vs	  JA	   0.464	   0.08	   34.08***	   1.59	   [1.36	  -­‐	  1.86]	  
5th	  trial	  NJA	  vs	  JA	   0.309	   0.08	   15.02***	   1.36	   [1.17	  -­‐	  1.59]	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  NAIVE:	  Main	  effect	  of	  trials	  
	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  2nd	  trial	  NJA	  vs	  JA	   0.32	   0.113	   8.07**	   1.38	   [1.10	  -­‐	  1.72]	  
3rd	  trial	  NJA	  vs	  JA	   0.255	   0.114	   4.98*	   1.29	   [1.03	  -­‐	  1.62]	  
4th	  trial	  NJA	  vs	  JA	   0.432	   0.114	   14.32***	   1.54	   [1.23	  -­‐	  1.93]	  
5th	  trial	  NJA	  vs	  JA	   0.264	   0.115	   5.31*	   1.3	   [1.04	  -­‐	  1.63]	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  COOP:	  Main	  effect	  of	  trials	   	  	  
	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  3rd	  trial	  NJA	  vs	  JA	   0.328	   0.111	   8.76**	   1.39	   [1.12	  -­‐	  1.72]	  
4th	  trial	  NJA	  vs	  JA	   0.489	   0.112	   19.09***	   1.63	   [1.31	  -­‐	  2.03]	  
5th	  trial	  NJA	  vs	  JA	   0.346	   0.112	   9.52**	   1.41	   [1.14	  -­‐	  1.76]	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
Notes: *** p<.001; ** p<.005; * p<.05. 
	   	   	   	   	  
 
 
3.2 Imaging 
 
3.2.1 Neural correlates of active engagement in social interaction 
Initial analysis of functional imaging data was driven by participants’ ratings. Irrespective of 
interaction context, blocks rated as ‘human’ (humall_block>comall_block) were accompanied by 
enhanced activation of the ventral striatum (VS) and the medial orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC; 
Figure 3A, Table 2A). In contrast, during blocks rated as ‘computer’ (comall_block>humall_block) 
there was increased activation of a fronto-parietal attention network (FPAN, Corbetta and 
Shulman, 2002) including the inferior parietal cortex, precuneus, and the lateral prefrontal cortex 
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(Figure 3B, Table 2B). When considering only the naïve context, ‘human’- versus ‘computer’-
rated blocks (humnaïve_block>comnaïve_block) engaged the mesolimbic reward system (Berridge et al., 
2009) including the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the VS (Figure 4A, Table 2C), while there 
were no significant results for the reverse contrast  (comnaïve_block>humnaïve_block). Conversely, in 
the cooperative context, there was increased activation of the FPAN during ‘computer’-rated 
blocks (comcoop_block>humcoop_block, Table 2D), while no regions were more active during 
‘human’-rated blocks (humcoop_block>comcoop_block). 
 
 
Figure 3: Neural activity during blocks rated as ‘human’ and ‘computer’ 
(A) The experience of interaction with another human participant recruits the ventral striatum (VS) and medial 
orbitofrontal cortex (mOFC). (B) The experience of an interaction as computer-driven is associated with activity in a 
fronto-parietal network including the inferior parietal sulcus (IPS), precuneus (PC), premotor cortex (PMC), and 
lateral prefrontal cortex (for all fMRI graphs: statistical threshold is p < .05 cluster-level-corrected for multiple 
comparisons; error bars depict 90% confidence intervals). 
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Table 2. Analyses based on participants’ subjective ratings of the nature of their interaction partner (‘human’ versus 
‘computer’).  
Region	   Cluster	   Side	  
MNI	  
Coordinates	   T	  
	  	   Size	   pFWE-­‐corr	   	  	   x	   y	   z	   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Whole	  block	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  A)	  humall_block	  >	  comall_block	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Nucleus	  accumbens	  (Ventral	  striatum)	   468	   .000	   R	   8	   4	   -­‐10	   4.96	  
Nucleus	  accumbens	  (Ventral	  striatum)	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐6	   10	   -­‐8	   4.57	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  mOFC	   326	   .002	   R	   4	   48	   -­‐16	   4.61	  
mOFC	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐8	   42	   -­‐12	   3.98	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  B)	  comall_block	  >	  humall_block	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Supramarginal	  gyrus	   2919	   .000	   R	   52	   -­‐42	   36	   4.88	  
Intraparietal	  sulcus	  
	   	  
R	   34	   -­‐60	   44	   4.88	  
Precuneus	  
	   	  
R	   10	   -­‐60	   40	   4.67	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Intraparietal	  sulcus	   1513	   .000	   L	   -­‐30	   -­‐48	   32	   5.63	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	   1455	   .000	   R	   40	   56	   -­‐2	   5.04	  
Lateral	  orbital	  sulcus	  
	   	  
R	   46	   48	   -­‐12	   4.93	  
Middle	  frontal	  gyrus	  
	   	  
R	   52	   38	   22	   4.39	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Middle	  frontal	  gyrus	   1207	   .000	   R	   32	   6	   60	   4.89	  
Superior	  frontal	  sulcus	  
	   	  
R	   22	   14	   42	   4.82	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	   332	   .013	   L	   -­‐36	   56	   2	   4.39	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  C)	  humnaïve_block	  >	  comnaïve_block	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Nucleus	  accumbens	  (Ventral	  striatum)	   836	   .000	   R	   10	   4	   -­‐10	   5.17	  
Medial	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  
	   	  
R	   6	   22	   -­‐10	   4.40	  
Putamen	  
	   	  
R	   24	   20	   0	   4.14	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	   299	   .020	   L	   -­‐8	   32	   6	   4.54	  
Anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  
	   	  
R	   10	   28	   16	   3.75	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Nucleus	  accumbens	   248	   .039	   L	   -­‐10	   2	   -­‐2	   4.19	  
Putamen	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐8	   16	   2	   4.14	  
Medial	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐8	   28	   -­‐12	   3.98	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Substantia	  nigra/Subthalamic	  nucleus	   243	   .043	   L	   -­‐6	   -­‐6	   -­‐16	   4.53	  
Ventral	  tegmental	  area	  
	   	  
R	   6	   -­‐24	   -­‐18	   4.46	  
Ventral	  tegmental	  area	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐6	   -­‐20	   -­‐18	   4.07	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D)	  comcoop_block	  >	  humcoop_block	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Intraparietal	  sulcus	   10451	   .000	   R	   36	   -­‐44	   34	   6.23	  
Precuneus	  
	   	  
R	   8	   -­‐58	   42	   6.11	  
Supramarginal	  gyrus	  
	   	  
R	   50	   -­‐44	   36	   6.03	  
Intraparietal	  sulcus	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐32	   -­‐54	   40	   5.87	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Inferior	  frontal	  sulcus	   6743	   .000	   R	   28	   52	   4	   6.56	  
Inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	  
	   	  
R	   40	   56	   -­‐2	   6.29	  
Middle	  frontal	  gyrus	  
	   	  
R	   32	   8	   60	   6.21	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Middle	  frontal	  gyrus	   936	   .000	   L	   -­‐50	   24	   34	   6.47	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Lateral	  orbital	  gyrus	   868	   .000	   L	   -­‐35	   56	   -­‐8	   5.17	  
Inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐34	   48	   2	   4.98	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  First	  two	  trials	  of	  block	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  E)	  humnaïve_early	  >	  comnaïve_early	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Nucleus	  accumbens	  (Ventral	  striatum)	   704	   .012	   L	   -­‐12	   6	   -­‐6	   4.35	  
Caudate	  nucleus	  (head)	   	   	   L	   -­‐10	   18	   2	   4.08	  
Putamen	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐18	   18	   -­‐8	   3.92	  
Medial	  orbital	  gyrus	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐22	   14	   16	   3.93	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Parametric	  increase	  over	  block	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  F)	  humcoop_param	  >	  comcoop_param	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Nucleus	  accumbens	  (Ventral	  striatum)	   719	   .000	   R	   6	   6	   -­‐4	   4.49	  
Nucleus	  accumbens	  (Ventral	  striatum)	   	   	   L	   -­‐6	   10	   -­‐8	   4.45	  
Putamen	  
	   	  
R	   20	   14	   -­‐10	   3.84	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  G)	  comcoop_param	  >	  humcoop_param	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Angular	  gyrus	   474	   .001	   R	   42	   -­‐64	   52	   4.25	  
Angular	  gyrus	  
	   	  
R	   48	   -­‐64	   34	   4.07	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	   201	   .051	   R	   44	   30	   24	   4.13	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Figure 4: Modulation of reward processing by interaction context  
(A) In the naïve context, blocks rated as ‘human’ recruit mesolimbic reward areas relative to ‘computer’-rated 
blocks. This includes the ventral tegmental area (VTA) and the ventral striatum (VS). (B) The activity of the VS is 
predictive of participants’ ratings already during the first two trials of a block. (C) In the cooperative context, 
activity in the ventral striatum (VS) unfolds over the time course of interaction blocks (i.e. with increasing trial 
progression) rated as ‘human’. 
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3.2.2 Neural correlates of temporal integration of information 
Further fMRI analyses (analyses 2 and 3) were driven by the behavioral finding of early versus 
linear integration of gaze reactions in the naïve and cooperative context, respectively. With 
respect to the early integration during the first two trials of blocks, VS activity during the first 
two trials of a block was predictive of participants’ ‘human’ ratings exclusively in the naïve 
context (humnaïve_first>comnaïve_first, Figure 4B, Table 2E). On the contrary, only in the cooperative 
context, linear parametric analyses including trial progression as a parametric regressor revealed 
an increase of VS activity with increasing trial progression over the full length of blocks rated as 
‘human’ (humcoop_param>comcoop_param , Figure 4C, Table 2F). Neural differentiation of social 
interaction therefore occurs early during naïve interactions while developing over time during 
cooperative interactions. The latter finding explains the lack of differential activity during the 
entire block for ‘human’- versus ‘computer’-rated blocks in the cooperative context, when 
activity during the entire block is compared (humcoop_block>comcoop_block).  
 
3.2.3 Neural processing of gaze in interaction   
Finally, the agent’s gaze behavior was used to analyze fMRI data with respect to gaze 
contingency (analysis 4) and at the level of single events (analysis 5). In the naïve context, single 
joint attention trials (JAnaïve>NJAnaïve) recruited regions associated with the ‘social brain 
network’ (Frith, 2007) involving the bilateral anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the left 
amygdala, medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), temporal pole, and superior temporal sulcus (Figure 
5, Table 3). However, the analysis focusing on effects of gaze contingency (naïveincrease_JA) 
revealed increases of activity in the bilateral paracentral lobule, but not in social brain regions 
(Table 4A). In the cooperative context, there was no differential activity at single-trial level 
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(JAcoop>NJAcoop). Instead, results showed an increase of activity with increasing positive 
contingency (coopincrease_JA) in the dorsal striatum, the thalamus, the ACC and the mPFC (Figure 
6A, Table 4C). This indicates that the social brain network is recruited by behavioral 
consistency. Increasing negative contingency (coopincrease_NJA) recruited the FPAN (Figure 6B, 
Table 4D).  
 
Figure 5: Event-related analysis of joint attention in the naïve context 
Event-related analysis of single events of joint attention revealed activation in regions of the social brain network 
including the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC), amygdala (Amy), and the anterior region of the superior temporal 
sulcus (aSTS). In addition, activity in the paracentral lobule (PL) was enhanced.  
 
Table 3. Event-related analyses of gaze reactions compared JA with NJA trials. 
Region	   Cluster	   Side	  
MNI	  
Coordinates	   T	  
	  	   Size	   pFWE-­‐corr	   	  	   x	   y	   z	   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  JAnaïve	  >	  NJAnaïve	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Precentral	  gyrus	   3207	   .000	   R	   26	   -­‐22	   60	   5.86	  
Postcentral	  gyrus	  
	   	  
R	   32	   -­‐30	   62	   5.31	  
Postcentral	  gyrus	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐20	   -­‐40	   56	   5.05	  
Middle	  cingulate	  cortex	  
	   	  
R	   12	   -­‐16	   42	   4.66	  
Middle	  cingulate	  cortex	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐8	   -­‐2	   34	   4.60	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Paracentral	  lobule	  
	   	  
R	   4	   -­‐24	   48	   4.57	  
Paracentral	  lobule	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐8	   -­‐24	   48	   4.56	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Amygdala	   510	   .001	   L	   -­‐22	   -­‐6	   -­‐14	   4.82	  
Medial	  orbitofrontal	  cortex	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐22	   8	   -­‐22	   4.28	  
Putamen	  (Ventral	  striatum)	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐20	   8	   -­‐6	   3.80	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Thalamus	   410	   .003	   L	   -­‐4	   -­‐18	   14	   4.66	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Superior	  temporal	  sulcus	  (anterior	  region)	   398	   .004	   L	   -­‐46	   -­‐6	   -­‐8	   4.59	  
Temporal	  pole	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐54	   8	   -­‐14	   3.93	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Ventromedial	  prefrontal	  cortex	   364	   .006	   R	   4	   44	   -­‐16	   5.17	  
Anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  
	   	  
R	   4	   36	   10	   3.90	  
Anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐4	   38	   2	   3.61	  
	   	   	   	   	   	  
 
 
Table 4. Analysis based on the contingency of the agent’s gaze behavior.  
The number of joint attention (JA) trials per interaction block was used as a parametric regressor. Both the contrasts 
referring to increasing numbers of JA as well as increasing numbers of non-joint attention (NJA) trials were reported 
to obtain information about the neural integration of positive and negative contingency of gaze reactions. 
 
Region	   Cluster	   Side	  
MNI	  
Coordinates	   T	  
	  	   Size	   pFWE-­‐corr	   	  	   x	   y	   z	   	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  A)	  naïveincrease_JA	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Paracentral	  lobule	   217	   .002	   R	   4	   -­‐32	   54	   3.89	  
Paracentral	  lobule	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐2	   -­‐22	   58	   3.63	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  B)	  naïveincrease_NJA	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  
Superior	  occipital	  gyrus	   277	   .009	   R	   30	   -­‐78	   20	   4.09	  
Middle	  occipital	  gyrus	  
	   	  
R	   30	   -­‐72	   32	   3.97	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  C)	  coopincrease_JA	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Caudate	  nucleus	   3048	   .000	   L	   -­‐16	   14	   -­‐6	   5.38	  
Anterior	  cingulate	  cortex	  
	   	  
R	   2	   20	   22	   5.15	  
Caudate	  nucleus	  
	   	  
R	   22	   20	   4	   5.02	  
Putamen	  
	   	  
L	   -­‐18	   14	   0	   4.98	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Thalamus	   495	   .000	   R	   18	   -­‐16	   12	   4.20	  
Thalamus	  
	   	  
R	   0	   22	   6	   3.98	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D)	  coopincrease_NJA	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Precuneus	   2493	   .000	   R	   10	   -­‐58	   48	   6.20	  
Intraparietal	  sulcus	  
	   	  
R	   40	   -­‐46	   44	   5.53	  
Superior	  parietal	  lobule	  
	   	  
R	   36	   -­‐60	   62	   5.09	  
Supramarginal	  gyrus	  
	   	  
R	   46	   -­‐36	   40	   4.96	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Middle	  frontal	  gyrus	   932	   .000	   R	   50	   24	   34	   5.91	  
Middle	  frontal	  gyrus	  
	   	  
R	   36	   12	   60	   4.49	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Intraparietal	  sulcus	   878	   .000	   L	   -­‐36	   -­‐56	   40	   4.77	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   	   	  Inferior	  frontal	  gyrus	   869	   .000	   R	   32	   60	   8	   5.10	  
Lateral	  orbital	  gyrus	  
	   	  
R	   44	   48	   -­‐14	   4.68	  
	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	   	  	  
 
 
 
Figure 6: Temporal integration of gaze reactions in the cooperative context 
(A) Parametric increases of activity with increasing numbers of joint attention trials per block in the caudate nucleus 
(NC), the putamen (Put), the thalamus (Thal), the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the medial prefrontal cortex 
(mPFC). (B) Parametric increases of activity with increasing numbers of non-joint attention trials per block in the 
FPAN including the precuneus (PC), intraparietal sulcus (IPS), and regions of the IFG and MFG corresponding to 
the dorso- and ventrolateral prefrontal cortex. Parameter estimates are only shown for the maxima of the largest 
clusters. 
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4. Discussion 
 
The present study aimed at unraveling the neural substrates of the subjective experience of 
engagement in social interaction with another person in real-time. We made use of an interactive 
eye-tracking paradigm in which participants indicated whether they experienced an interaction as 
human- or computer-mediated based on the gaze behavior of a virtual agent (Pfeiffer et al., 
2011). Behavioral judgments of humanness and the accompanying neural activations were 
influenced substantially by the interaction context. When participants interacted with a naïve –
interaction partner, the congruency of gaze reactions provided the major cue to humanness of the 
partner. When the interaction partner was explicitly cooperative, general contingency as 
compared to mere congruency of gaze reactions was interpreted as indicative of being in 
interaction with another human being. These results constitute a within-subject replication of an 
extensive between-subject pilot study (Pfeiffer et al., 2011), thereby implicating a universal 
difference in mindset between unconstrained and cooperative interactions. In-depth regression 
analyses of the influence of trial type with increasing trial progression revealed that there was an 
early influence of trial type (i.e. whether a trial was a JA or an NJA trial) in the naïve context, 
whereas there was an increasing influence of trial type in the cooperative context. This strongly 
suggests fundamental differences in the integration of information as a function of interaction 
context. This is complemented by neuroimaging results showing that the subjective experience 
of being engaged in social interaction is predicted by early ventral striatal activation in the naïve 
context. In contrast, during cooperative interactions, activity in this region increased 
differentially with increasing trial position in those interaction blocks rated as human. Taken 
together, these findings provide first-time evidence that the mere subjective experience of social 
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interaction with another human is sufficient to recruit the mesolimbic reward system, including 
the VTA, the VS, and the mOFC (Alcaro et al., 2007). Furthermore, they argue for different 
functions of the reward system during unconstrained and cooperative social interactions. 
 
4.1 The rewarding nature of social interactions 
The present results provide a fundamental extension of previous studies on social rewards. In 
addition to the more general observation that inert social stimuli recruit the VS similar to 
monetary rewards (Izuma et al., 2008; Spreckelmeyer et al., 2009), neuroeconomic studies have 
demonstrated an involvement of both mOFC and ventral striatum in social interactions. For 
instance, Rilling and colleagues scanned participants playing a Prisoner’s Dilemma Game with 
another person or a computer (Rilling et al., 2002). In each round, players could choose to defect 
or to cooperate, with cooperation representing the riskier choice in terms of monetary outcome. 
Mutual cooperation generally led to increased activity in the anterior cingulate cortex, the 
mOFC, and the VS. However, the VS was not activated during cooperation with a computer, 
thus suggesting that activity in this area is specifically related to positive reinforcement by 
mutual cooperation with a human conspecific. Using multi-round trust games, it has accordingly 
been demonstrated that both the intention to trust someone (King-Casas et al., 2005) and another 
person’s reputation for positive reciprocity are encoded in the striatum (Phan et al., 2010).  
While these findings suggest a role of reward-related processes during human social 
encounters, they rely on static social stimuli or complex economic interactions and do not answer 
the question whether the experience of human social interaction per se recruits the reward 
system. Furthermore, in other studies employing a human-computer distinction subjects were 
informed a priori whether they would be interacting with another person or a computer program 
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(e.g. Decety et al., 2004; McCabe et al., 2001; Sanfey et al., 2003). This prevents an assessment 
of participants’ phenomenological experience of an interaction as social (De Jaegher and Di 
Paolo, 2007). In contrast, the present study required participants to determine the nature of their 
counterpart via the interaction itself and hence focuses on the subjective experience.  
The results reported here raise the question whether the engagement in social interaction 
and the processing of rewards share common anatomical substrates. Intriguingly, a recent study 
revealed a significant correlation between social reward dependence – i.e. a measure of an 
individual’s propensity to engage in social interaction – and gray matter density in the VS and 
the mOFC (Lebreton et al., 2009a). Another morphometric study found a positive correlation 
between mOFC volume and participants’ capacity to infer intentions from stories describing 
social interactions (Powell et al., 2010). These studies suggest an overlap between structural 
predispositions for the engagement and performance in social interactions and brain regions 
involved in the processing of rewards and thereby lend support to the major finding of this study. 
While social affiliation is among our most basic needs (Baumeister and Leary, 1995), 
caution must be exercised because not any kind of social interaction is necessarily related to 
reward and positive affect. For example, studies using designs involving competition with a 
human counterpart have not found reward-related neural activations in situations of explicit 
competition rather than cooperation (Decety et al., 2004; Polosan et al., 2011). Furthermore, it 
has long been known that intergroup relations constitute an important determinant of the 
emotional valence of an interaction (Cikara and Bavel, 2014)  – for example, interacting with a 
member of an out-group might foster conflict and negative emotions such as fear and disgust, 
while the interaction with in-group members is related to positive emotions (e.g. Rilling et al., 
2008).  
31 
 
4.2 The ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ of social interactions  
The processing of rewards has been divided into ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ components (Berridge et 
al., 2009). In the naïve context, striatal activity during the first two trials reliably predicted that 
an interaction will be rated as ‘human’. Concordantly, post-hoc ratings revealed that participants 
relied on their intuition in this context (Figure 6B), and preferred thinking about the behavior of 
a human conspecific rather than a computer when making the decision (Figure 6D). There are 
two possible interpretations of this finding. The first possibility is that the VS encodes a 
prediction signal. It has been repeatedly shown that the VS is involved in the prediction of 
rewards (e.g. Schultz and Dickinson, 2000; Bromberg-Martin et al., 2010). Specifically, 
dopaminergic neurons of the nucleus accumbens encode a reward prediction error which relates 
to the difference between a predicted reward and the reward which actually occurs (Schultz et 
al., 1997). It is hence possible that the early activation of the VS in human-rated blocks within 
the naïve context represents a reward prediction signal. It has further been argued that neural 
activity related to reward prediction should be involved in encoding the contingency between a 
stimulus potentially predicting reward and the actual reward (Schultz, 2006). In the case of our 
study, however, there is no measurable contingency between the second trial of a block and the 
continuing trial progression because trial order is completely randomized. This implicates that 
the VS should not be able to calculate a reliable reward prediction error.     
In other words, the agent’s behavior during the first two trials is actually inconclusive 
regarding the nature of the counterpart. Therefore, it is possible that the early striatal activation 
in human-rated blocks in the naïve interaction context might relate to the ‘wanting’ component 
associated with the human need to interact (Baumeister and Leary, 1995). Albeit speculative, this 
interpretation would be consistent with the previous observation that the VS conveys automatic 
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incentive signals to the mOFC during initial stages of impression formation (Kim et al., 2007). If 
such an association of the VS with the motivational drive for interaction could be confirmed in 
future studies, these results might contribute to a larger picture of the VS as an automatic 
valuation system which encodes preferences irrespective of stimulus modality and task demands 
(Lebreton et al., 2009b). 
Although our results do not provide a direct proof of this idea, one might speculate that if 
a need for interaction represents the ‘wanting’ component, its fulfillment by the actual 
experience of engagement in interaction might correspond to reward ‘liking’. Behaviorally, this 
idea gains support by participants’ post-experience ratings which indicate that social interactions 
are experienced as more pleasant than non-social interactions (Figure 2C). The subjective 
hedonic experience of rewards has been attributed to the mOFC rather than the VS (for recent 
reviews see Diekhof et al., 2012; Peters and Büchel, 2010). Interestingly, the mOFC was active 
during blocks rated as ‘human’ irrespective of interaction context, which might possibly reflect a 
general ‘liking’ of being engaged in interaction. Although task structure does not allow any 
direct proof of this interpretation, post-experiment questionnaires did not provide any hint to a 
difference in the perceived pleasantness of naïve and cooperative human interactions. This might 
be interpreted as evidence that neural activity related to the subjective experience of reward 
should not be affected by the context of the interaction. Indeed, our results show that the 
interaction context exclusively modulates VS function and thus implicate that activation of the 
mOFC – and not the VS – might be related to the pleasantness of being in interaction with 
another human. At present, however, explanations which address such detailed functional 
segregations must remain speculative. Future studies involving carefully devised online 
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interaction paradigms specifically aimed at differentiating the desire for human interaction and 
the pleasure of being engaged in interaction are needed to confirm these hypotheses.  
In a more general framework, the concept that social interaction represents a reward in 
itself is supported by previous studies indicating that social exclusion – which can be regarded as 
an externally forced disengagement from social interaction – is correlated with activity in the 
pain network (Eisenberger et al., 2003). Specifically, novel social encounters create instant 
expectations regarding another person’s behavior whose violation is correlated with activation of 
the anterior cingulate cortex, an important component of this network (Somerville et al., 2006). 
Moreover, the fulfillment of such expectations might recruit the reward system and thereby pave 
the way to the establishment of a prolonged relationship (Baumeister and Leary, 1995) which is 
consequently assigned with high reward-value in future interactions (Fareri et al., 2012). 
 
4.3 Accumulation of value in cooperative interactions  
Importantly, there are ultimate as well as proximate definitions of cooperation. The former relate 
to the survival value of a behavior, whereas the latter relate to the underlying mechanisms (West 
et al., 2007). In its ultimate definition, cooperation is a behavior selected to create mutual benefit 
for an actor and a recipient (e.g. Fehr and Rockenbach, 2004). It often requires the actor to 
sacrifice an immediate reward (i.e. reward discounting) in order to create a mutual, but delayed 
benefit for both actor and recipient (Axelrod, 1984). However, cooperation has also been 
described as a form of behavioral coordination which is a proximate mechanism required for 
obtaining mutual benefit (e.g. Noë, 2006; Taborsky, 2007). Obviously, the introduction of a 
cooperative interaction partner in the present study is not directly related to evolutionary fitness 
but rather to behavioral coordination. Accordingly, behavioral results (Figure 1D) showed that – 
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irrespective of overall congruency – coordinated behavior is judged as indicative of a human 
interaction partner. This replicates results of a behavioral pilot study which assessed naïve and 
cooperative interactions in a between-subject design (Pfeiffer et al., 2011).  
Neuroimaging data complemented these behavioral observations. As expected, the 
cooperative context was also associated with reward processing. Notably, however, there was no 
early activation of the VS as in the naïve context, but a gradual increase of striatal activity with 
increasing trial progression. Considering that the human interaction partner allegedly facilitated 
participants’ decisions, consistent behavior had to be detected by an accumulation of information 
over time rather than by trusting initial intuitions (Pfeiffer et al., 2011). The question arising here 
is whether the differential increase of VS activity in blocks rated as human relates to a general 
accumulation of evidence for a choice (e.g. Heekeren et al., 2008) or to an accumulation of value 
inherent to that choice (e.g. Rangel et al., 2008). In our opinion, the differential increase of VS 
activity over cooperative interaction blocks rated as human is reflective of value rather than 
evidence accumulation. The latter has mainly been investigated in studies on perceptual 
decision-making and is considered to be an effortful and noisy process due to fuzzy category 
boundaries (Ratcliff and McKoon, 2008). In contrast, the decision criterion for social interaction 
during cooperation is comparatively straightforward because only behavior that is highly 
contingent is taken as evidence for the agent being controlled by another human.  
A recent study directly investigated whether VS activation during decision-making is 
related to the accumulation of evidence in general or the accumulation of value (Gluth et al., 
2012). In a buying task, a number of positive and negative ratings of a product were sequentially 
disclosed to participants. The general disclosure of the ratings correlated with activity in the pre-
SMA and anterior insula. As this activity was neither influenced by the valence of the ratings nor 
35 
 
by the buying decision, it was argued to reflect the accumulation of evidence. In contrast, the VS 
specifically updated the representation of value when positive ratings were disclosed. This can be 
directly compared to our study: In each trial, novel information regarding the nature of the 
interaction partner is revealed in the form of the agent’s gaze reactions. Each trial of an 
interaction block rated as ‘human’ during cooperative interactions therefore must have been 
interpreted as positive evidence that the agent is controlled by a human interaction partner. 
Furthermore, the specificity of striatal activation for ‘human’-rated blocks argues against general 
evidence accumulation. The differential linear increase of VS activity with these trials thus 
reflects the accumulation of value rather than evidence per se (Figure 3C), which is consistent 
with the previously described role of this region in encoding benefit signals during decision-
making (Basten et al., 2010).  
 
4.4 Contextual modulation of gaze processing in social interaction 
The contextual modulation of the neural processing of the agent’s gaze reactions allows a deeper 
understanding of the integration of information underlying reward-based decisions. First insights 
come from event-related analyses of JA and NJA. In the naïve context, activity in the mPFC and 
aSTS was confined to single joint attention trials. The involvement of these regions in the 
inference of mental states suggests that the social salience of gaze behavior is processed in a 
trial-by-trial fashion (Schilbach et al., 2010; Redcay et al., 2012). Furthermore, activation of the 
reward system is confined to single events of joint, but not non-joint attention (Gordon et al., 
2013; Schilbach et al., 2010), thereby indicating that making someone follow your gaze 
represents a reward in itself. In contrast, in cooperative interactions, single events are only 
indicative of a human counterpart when part of contingent behavior. Accordingly, positive 
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contingency was processed by the dorsal striatum, while negative contingency recruited the 
FPAN. Possibly, this interplay of reward and attention networks reflects a distribution of 
cognitive resources required to ensure that joint attention is only considered as a social cue in 
cases of high contingency. The dorsal striatum is also recruited in iterated trust-games (King-
Casas et al., 2005), which require participants to monitor a cooperators’ actions across multiple 
rounds and demand similar temporal binding of contingent information as the present task 
(McCabe et al., 2001). Furthermore, it plays a role whenever participants experience contingency 
between their actions and a reward (Tricomi et al., 2004). This is consistent with the recent 
observation that successful initiation of joint attention results in an increased experience of 
agency (Pfeiffer et al., 2012), and hence suggests that the reward value of cooperative 
interactions relies on the experience of contextually meaningful contingencies between one’s 
own actions and another individual’s behavior. 
 
4.5 Limitations of the present study 
Despite the novelty of our findings, there are several limitations with respect to study design and 
the interpretation of the results.  
First of all, it must be emphasized that no interaction in our study is an actual interaction 
with a real human interaction partner. It would therefore be misleading to claim that the paper 
discusses the neural substrates of engagement in human social interaction. Instead, task design 
elicited participants’ subjective experience of being engaged in interaction with a human 
counterpart. Although it is conceivable that the underlying neural mechanisms are similar, the 
distinction between subjective experience and actual engagement must be kept in mind when 
interpreting the results.  
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Directly related to the first limitation, a more general limitation is imposed by the 
interaction task itself. Although ecological validity and behavioral realism of the interactive eye-
tracking paradigm are high (e.g. Fox et al., 2009; Schroeder, 2002), the gaze-based interactions 
are still comparably inflexible in contrast to everyday social interactions which are rich in 
dynamics and sensory detail. However, while some EEG studies have investigated more dynamic 
interactions (e.g. Dumas et al., 2010; Lachat et al., 2012; Tognoli et al., 2007), possibilities to do 
so are limited in MRI scanners which are required to detect activity in subcortical structures 
related to motivational and reward processes (for a methodological discussion see Pfeiffer et al., 
2013). For this reason, neuroimaging studies of real-time social interactions are currently still 
limited by a trade-off between social realism and technical feasibility. To move towards even 
more naturalistic interactions, future gaze-based tasks could involve important modulators of our 
experience of social interaction such as emotional expressions (Adams and Kleck, 2005) or 
culture (Krämer et al., 2013).  
Third, it must be noted here that the present study was not explicitly designed to 
disentangle the neural mechanisms underlying the motivational desire for social interaction on 
the one hand and the pleasantness of being engaged in interaction on the other. To some extent, 
the corresponding discussion is thus speculative. More work is clearly needed to uncover the 
precise roles of the VS and mOFC in encoding the motivational aspects of ‘online’ social 
interactions (Schilbach et al., 2013). Such studies would also need to include refined behavioral 
measures of the subjective pleasantness of social interactions which could then be included in 
parametric analyses of functional imaging data. In addition, it would be helpful to obtain 
indicators of participants’ propensity to engage in social interaction, for example by assessing 
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their social reward dependence using Cloninger’s Temperament and Character Inventory 
(Cloninger et al., 1993). 
Besides these conceptual issues, there are also some methodological caveats. The first  
concerns the lack of randomization of the order of interaction contexts due to the importance of 
keeping participants naïve with respect to the task in the naïve context. Despite the fact that 
behavioral results replicate those of a between-subject study (Pfeiffer et al., 2011) and that 
participants were given an extended practice session to prevent novelty and habituation effects, 
we cannot fully exclude the possibility of sequence effects. Future studies should therefore use 
designs allowing a more direct comparison of unconstrained and cooperative interactions. 
The final methodological aspect relates to the limited number of blocks per experimental 
condition (i.e. six), which decreases statistical power and thereby prevents in-depth assessment 
of mechanisms relating to reward prediction and accumulation of evidence in general. As reward 
prediction plays an important role in virtually all decision-making tasks (Berridge et al., 2009; 
Daniel and Pollmann, 2014), future studies would have to be designed in such a way that the 
motivational and learning-related aspects of VS function can clearly be disentangled. 
Taken together, we believe that in light of the scarcity of studies investigating social 
encounters in real-time and despite the limitations discussed above, the present study provides 
important insights into the motivational mechanisms underlying the subjective experience of 
engagement in social interaction (Becchio et al., 2010; De Jaegher et al., 2010; Schilbach et al., 
2013).   
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5. Conclusion 
In sum, this study demonstrates how the neural systems possibly sustaining the active 
engagement in social interaction can be examined using a novel, interactive paradigm. It 
provides first evidence that the social nature of human primates rests upon an urge to interact and 
upon the rewarding nature of the active participation in social interactions. The present results 
hence further endorse the proposal of a human predisposition for cooperation (Tomasello, 2009) 
by suggesting that a fundamental motive for cooperation could be the sustainment of an 
interaction with another person. A final note concerns the potential of the present study to foster 
our understanding of autism spectrum disorders (ASD). It has recently been claimed that autism 
is primarily an impairment of social motivation, with disturbances of both ‘wanting’ and ‘liking’ 
of social rewards (Chevallier et al., 2012). Although first studies support this idea by 
demonstrating hypoactivation of the nucleus accumbens during the anticipation of social rewards 
(Delmonte et al., 2012; Richey et al., 2014), there are no studies examining the brains of persons 
with ASD while they are actively engaged in social interaction. It is hence conceivable that the 
present paradigm could provide a tool to test the social motivation hypothesis under ecologically 
valid but controlled conditions.  
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